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DISTINGUISHING TRUSTEES AND PROTECTING
BENEFICIARIES: A RESPONSE TO
PROFESSOR LESLIE
Karen E. Boxx∗
It has long been recognized that different types of fiduciaries must
be held to different degrees of duty to their beneficiaries. As stated by
Professor Scott:
Some fiduciary relationships are undoubtedly more intense than
others. The greater the independent authority to be exercised by the
fiduciary, the greater the scope of his fiduciary duty. Thus, a trustee
is under a stricter duty of loyalty than is an agent upon whom limited
authority is conferred or a corporate director who can act only as a
member of the board of directors or a promoter acting for investors
in a new corporation.1

Although the extent of discretionary power held by the fiduciary is
the primary reason for the sliding scale of fiduciary duty, other aspects
of the fiduciary role at issue have played a role in defining the duty. For
example, the larger the personal stake that the fiduciary has in the
enterprise (such as a partner or majority shareholder), the lesser the duty
of loyalty, because it is presumed the fiduciary’s personal interests will
contribute to the protection of the beneficiary.2 In cases where a court
has found a fiduciary relationship outside of the traditional categories,
the duty imposed is usually defined by the facts of the relationship and
the particular need for protection.3
The recognized variation in the stringencies of the duties is
reflected in the lack of a uniform definition of fiduciary. Although
scholars have struggled to devise a universal concept that would
encompass all fiduciary relationships, they have yet to reach a
consensus.4
∗ This is a revised version of a comment presented at the Trust Law In the 21st Century
Conference held at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, on September 19, 2005. The author is
an associate professor at the University of Washington School of Law. The author is very
grateful to Professor Melanie Leslie and Professor Stewart Sterk for giving her the opportunity to
participate.
1 Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CAL. L. REV. 539, 541 (1949).
2 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. &
ECON. 425, 432-34 (1993).
3 E.g., Taeger v. Catholic Family & Cmty. Servs., 995 P.2d 721 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999)
(fiduciary duty owed by adoption agency to adoptive parents limited to duty of disclosure);
Schneider v. Plymouth State Coll., 744 A.2d 101, 106 (N.H. 1999) (finding that school breached
fiduciary duty to students to “create an environment in which the plaintiff could pursue her
education free from sexual harassment”); see also Gregory B. Westfall, “But I Know It When I
See It”: A Practical Framework for Analysis and Argument of Informal Fiduciary Relationships,
23 TEX. TECH L. REV. 835 (1992).
4 See P.D. Finn, The Fiduciary Principle, in EQUITIES, FIDUCIARIES AND TRUSTS 1, 24 (T.G.
Youdan ed., 1989) (“It is striking that a principle so long standing and so widely accepted should
be the subject of the uncertainty that now prevails.”); J.C. Shepherd, Towards a Unified Concept

2753

2754

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:6

It is therefore understandable that courts and legislatures cling to
what little certainty they can find. The role of trustee is the archetypal
fiduciary relationship, with a long history of defined rules.5 Courts and
legislatures are therefore reluctant to allow the ambiguity surrounding
other fiduciary relationships to invade the one area thought to be settled.
However, as Professor Leslie has astutely pointed out in her article, the
roles of the professional institutional trustee and amateur family
member trustee vary just as significantly as the roles of fiduciaries of
different entities, such as trustee and corporate director.6
Parallels can be drawn to other types of fiduciaries. For example,
the corporate manager/shareholder relationship in closely held
corporations is functionally different than the manager/shareholder
relationship in a publicly traded corporation, and that difference has
been acknowledged as requiring different levels of fiduciary duty.7
Also, California statutes specifically acknowledge that an
uncompensated attorney-in-fact or custodian under the Uniform
Transfers to Minors Act should be held to a lower standard of care than
one who is paid for his or her services.8
Courts should not be reluctant to move away from the rigid rules
governing trustees, since they have in fact been trying to accomplish the
same goal by more indirect means. Professor Leslie points to several
reported decisions where courts have not enforced the no further inquiry
rule where the trustee is an amateur.9 Careful review of those decisions
show that in each case, however, the courts stuck to the technical
requirements of the rule, either finding that the settlor had impliedly
authorized the self-dealing or using another route to escape application
of the rule.10
of Fiduciary Relationships, 97 LAW Q. REV. 51, 52 (1981); Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond
Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 923 (1998) (calling
fiduciary duty “among the law’s most exotic species”).
5 See John Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 637
(1995).
6 Melanie B. Leslie, Common Law, Common Sense: Fiduciary Standards and Trustee
Identity, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2713 (2006).
7 See Brent Nicholson, The Fiduciary Duty of Close Corporation Shareholders: A Call for
Legislation, 30 AM. BUS. L.J. 513 (1992).
8 CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 4231, 3912(b)(1) (West 2006). The original Model Durable Power of
Attorney Act also treated uncompensated attorneys in fact differently. NATIONAL CONFERENCE
OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE
MEETING IN ITS SEVENTY THIRD YEAR 279 (1964). The Model Act provided three alternative
standards of liability for attorneys in fact, and one alternative provided that only compensated
attorneys in fact would be held to the standard of care of other fiduciaries. The Commissioners
who supported this alternative believed that a family member serving as attorney in fact without
pay should be subject to only limited liability. Id.
9 See Leslie, supra note 6, at 2729 n.56.
10 Helman v. Mendelson, 769 A.2d 1025, 1040-41 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001) (holding that
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Acknowledging the need to treat the two types of trustees
differently does not answer how each set of duties should be defined.
Professor Leslie’s proposal for the differing sets of duties is a good
starting point but could benefit from further consideration and debate.
For example, her argument that differences in ease of monitoring justify
a stricter standard imposed on professional fiduciaries overlooks the
unique difficulties of monitoring amateur fiduciaries.11 Regular
communication among family members is certainly not a given and not
all amateur trustees hold a family relationship with the trust
beneficiaries. Long held personal resentments and disagreements
between fiduciary and beneficiary, not present with a professional
trustee but possible with family member fiduciaries, can give rise to
deliberate silence or even miscommunication. Even the well-meaning
amateur may not have the skills or the time to give thorough, complete
information to the beneficiaries. The opposite is true of professional
trustees, who provide too much information in often overly complex
statements incomprehensible to an unsophisticated beneficiary. Thus,
while significant differences exist, both types of trustees present unique
monitoring difficulties that must be considered when fashioning levels
of fiduciary duty.
A key principle that distinguishes the trustee role, which is always
stated without distinguishing between types of trustees, is the no further
inquiry rule. Under that rule, if a trustee violates the prohibition against
self-dealing, the beneficiaries may void the transaction regardless of the
fairness of the transaction to the trust and its beneficiaries.12 The
general no further inquiry rule has exceptions established under
common law: where the settlor waives the prohibition against selfdealing, where the beneficiary consents to or ratifies a self-dealing
transaction, and where the trustee has advance court approval for a self-

loans from trust to trustee were not improper because trust contained exoneration clause);
Massara v. Henry, C.A. No. 19646, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 5425, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 22,
2000) (granting summary judgment in favor of fiduciary because no evidence of damage to
support breach of fiduciary duty claim; court did not consider no further inquiry rule because not
raised by appellant and pleadings did not raise specific claims of self dealing); Tays v. Matler,
173 F.3d 864 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he district court did not err in finding that [a good faith]
exception exists where the settlor intended a conflict of interest and gave the trustee broad
authority to invest trust funds.”) (quoting Tays v. Metler, No. 97-2317, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS
4769 at *8 (10th Cir. Mar. 19, 1999)); Warehime v. Warehime, 761 A.2d 1138, 1142 (2001)
(holding that where brother, who was shareholder and trustee of siblings’ voting trusts,
restructured voting rights of shares before expiration of trusts to retain control, his actions were
judged by exoneration clause in trust agreement that held trustee liable only for actions in bad
faith or grossly negligent).
11 See Leslie, supra note 6, at 2725-26.
12 GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES § 543, at 247-48 (2d ed. 1993).
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dealing transaction.13 Professor Leslie argues that the no further inquiry
rule should be maintained for professional trustees because the
beneficiaries will have difficulty detecting self-dealing transactions
between professional trustees and their corporate affiliates from the
complex statements provided to them.14 She further argues that amateur
trustees should be judged on a good faith rule, allowing such trustees to
defend a self-dealing transaction if it was entered into in good faith, on
the grounds that such trustee’s self-dealing is easier to detect and that
since most such trustees do not know about the no further inquiry rule, it
has no deterrent effect on them.15 Her article further characterizes the
current state of the law as a refusal by courts to enforce no further
inquiry against amateur trustees, and a statutory movement, initiated by
the Uniform Trust Code (UTC), to eliminate the no further inquiry rule
as it applies to professional trustees.16 The first point, about what the
standard should be for each type of trustee, warrants further
consideration of other characteristics of the two categories of trustee and
the role of the no further inquiry rule in each context. First, however, I
will address her description of the current state of the law, because my
own view of it differs.
As to the application of the no further inquiry rule to amateur
trustees, the cases cited by Professor Leslie in fact allow good faith to
excuse self-dealing, contrary to the no further inquiry rule, where the
transaction was not in fact harmful.17 But in each case, the court
grounded the deviation on a well-recognized exception to the rule.18
The sampling of available reported cases is small, however, and we
cannot know what is happening at the trial court level in unappealed
cases. There are also contrary examples.19 Therefore, although
Professor Leslie correctly points to these cases as evidence that courts
do not want to impose liability on well-meaning amateur trustees who
break the rules without doing harm,20 I am not confident that we are
now at the point that all courts will be able or willing to find a way not
to apply the no further inquiry rule in such cases.
13 2A AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §
170 (4th ed. 1987).
14 See Leslie, supra note 6, at 2717.
15 Id. at 2745-46.
16 S e e generally id.
17 The Warehime case may be an exception, since the trustee froze out the beneficiaries’
voting rights, even though the court excused the conduct on the basis that it was in the best
interests of the corporation whose stock was held in the trust. Warehime 761 A.2d 1138.
18 Id.
19 E.g., In re Estate of Stowell, 595 A.2d 1022 (Me. 1991); see also Charles Bryan Baron,
Self-Dealing Trustees and the Exoneration Clause: Can Trustees Ever Profit from Transactions
Involving Trust Property?, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 43 (1998).
20 See Leslie, supra note 6, at 2729 n.56.
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Professor Leslie’s concern about the Uniform Trust Code’s effect
on corporate trustee liability is based on premises that I would again
recharacterize. Section 802 of the UTC rephrases the common law test
of what constitutes self-dealing and both narrows and expands trustee
liability. Under common law, the no further inquiry rule applies in all
cases of self-dealing, except for settlor waiver or beneficiary or court
approval. If the transaction is not self-dealing, then it is tested under the
duty of care, that is, the prudent person standard.21 To determine what
is self-dealing, if the transaction is not directly between the trustee and
the trust, the test is whether the trustee’s personal interests are
substantially affected.22 If the conflict does not rise to the level of
“substantial,” the transaction is not considered self-dealing and is
approved if it meets the duty of care.23 Thus, the beneficiary must show
that the other party to the transaction was substantially allied with the
trustee’s own interests in order to obtain the benefit of the no further
inquiry rule.
The Uniform Trust Code changes the question. First, under the
UTC, no further inquiry applies only to direct transactions with the
trustee.24 If the transaction is with a party related to the trustee, the
UTC gives the beneficiary a presumption that the transaction is voidable
but allows the trustee to rebut the presumption.25 The text of the statute
does not set forth what is needed to rebut this presumption; the plain
language of the statute only implies that the trustee must establish that
the transaction was not affected by the conflict between the trustee’s
personal and fiduciary interests. The comments to section 802 state that
the trustee would have to prove that the transaction was in the best
interests of the trust and its beneficiaries.26
The question thus shifts from the common law question of how
close is the trustee’s connection to the transaction to whether the
transaction was in the trust’s and beneficiaries’ best interests.27

21 In Estate of Rothko, the court imposed heightened damages in a case of conflict of interest
that did not rise to self-dealing, but that case was unique. 372 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1977).
22 2A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 13, § 170.10 at 346.
23 Id. § 170.24, at 432-33.
24 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802(b) (2000).
25 Id. § 802(c).
26 It is critical to note that a uniform law’s comments are not voted on by the Uniform Laws
Commissioners, and are usually written by the Reporter in final form after completion of the Act.
The UTC Comments should therefore be considered only guides to interpretation. Professor
Leslie makes reference to the UTC Comments and this distinction is important to keep in mind
when considering her comments as well. See Leslie, supra note 6, at 2730-31, 2749-52.
27 The Comments to U.T.C. § 802 state that the fairness of the transaction is one piece of
evidence that the transaction was in the trust’s best interests. That is going too far, because a
fairness test pushes the transaction down to a duty of care test, where conflict of interest is
irrelevant.
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When a trustee deals with a related party, there has always been an
ambiguity that the beneficiary has to overcome. The UTC has simply
changed to a perhaps more relevant question in those cases: Was the
trust’s best interest nevertheless served? Under the common law test, if
the relationship is deemed too remote, then the transaction is tested just
for fairness. Under the UTC, all transactions with a related party, no
matter how remote, are tested for the trust’s best interests.28
Professor Leslie, on the other hand, reads UTC section 802 as
essentially eliminating the no further inquiry rule for professional
trustees.29 She reaches this conclusion on the basis that most selfdealing by professional trustees will be done with affiliates, due to the
current structure of institutional trustees (an assertion that is hard to
disagree with),30 and that allowing the trustee to rebut the presumption
reduces the test of self-dealing to a test of whether the transaction was
fair, similar to the test available to corporate directors.31
However, as noted above, the statute does not reduce the standard
to a mere duty of care, but instead shifts an already present question of
applicability of the no further inquiry rule to the question of whether the
transaction was in the trust’s best interests. The trustee would have the
burden of rebutting the presumption of an impermissible conflict.
Given the risk-averse inclination of professional trustees, the position of
having to rebut a presumption would likely be almost as unpleasant as
the threat of an irrebutable presumption and should not be discounted as
a deterrent to a professional trustee. Also, the UTC’s rephrasing of the
question when the transaction involves a related party rather than the
trustee itself focuses the issue on a less arbitrary standard than the
degree of relationship with the trustee, and can therefore give the
beneficiary an advantage in many cases.
Regardless of the current state of the law, the critical question
remains how these two very different fiduciaries should be treated.
Professor Leslie begins this analysis by considering potential variations
28 This is a more stringent test than fairness because a fairness standard can be met if the price
was fair, and that can be a fluid notion. Best interests, however, would consider other factors,
such as whether the beneficiaries wanted the property sold. See Allard v. Pac. Nat’l Bank, 663
P.2d 104 (Wash. 1983).
29 See Leslie, supra note 6, at 2731.
30 Indeed, a potentially larger concern is the expansion of the safe harbors available to
trustees (but mostly useful to professionals), which move certain self-dealing transactions to a
duty of care test. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802(f), (h); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3312
(2005) (providing a broad exception from self-dealing prohibition for all transactions with
“affiliates,” defined as any corporation or other entity that controls, is controlled by or is under
common control with the trustee, as long as the trustee gives notice (which can be given in a
prospectus) of all fees paid in connection with such transactions). The argument is that such
transactions are necessary for efficient operation of trust management.
31 See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.61(b)(3) (2004).
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in the rules regarding self-dealing and delegation. Looking at the
differences identified by Professor Leslie suggests other ways of
accommodating those differences. For example, she correctly points
out that the settlor’s intentions in selecting a professional trustee are
very different than the intentions in selecting a family member.32
Acknowledging those different intentions can be done in different
adjustments to the fiduciary rules other than a shift in the no further
inquiry rule. For example, another way to protect beneficiaries from
indifferent professional trustees is to increase the ease with which
beneficiaries can remove a professional trustee and replace it with
another professional.33 If a professional trustee is treated as fungible,
unless it could be shown that the settlor has strong reason for selecting
and retaining the particular professional trustee, then the professional
trustee would be forced to be responsive to the beneficiaries, thus
addressing many of the problems raised by Professor Leslie. The
pressure to provide safe harbors for professional trustees’ transactions
with affiliates34 and the traditional ambiguity surrounding application of
the no further inquiry rule when the transaction is with a related party35
indicate that a tightening of the no further inquiry rule may not be a
realistic solution to those problems.
With respect to the amateur trustees, Professor Leslie correctly
notes that when the settlor chooses a family member or friend as trustee,
that selection is most likely based on factors involving that particular
person’s attributes and relationships with the beneficiaries of the trust.36
Often, the trustee has a beneficial interest in the trust, such as in cases
where an adult child is named as trustee of a trust for settlor’s surviving
spouse, who may be parent of the trustee, where the adult child and her
siblings are the remainder beneficiaries. The effect of the no further
inquiry rule could be significantly ameliorated if courts recognized that
the settlor has impliedly waived any conflicts or self-dealing
prohibitions by putting a person with an interest in the trust in the
position of trustee. Broadening the exceptions to the self-dealing rule to
allow a good faith test where the structure of the trust indicates that such
32 See Leslie, supra note 6, at 2719.

33 For example, UTC § 706 allows a court to remove a trustee at the request of a beneficiary,
if “there has been a substantial change of circumstances or removal is requested by all of the
qualified beneficiaries, the court finds that removal of the trustee best serves the interests of all of
the beneficiaries and is not inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust, and a suitable
cotrustee or successor trustee is available.” UNIF. TRUST CODE § 706; see also WASH. REV.
CODE § 11.98.039 (2005) (providing that a trust beneficiary may request the court for a change of
trustee for any “reasonable cause,” with no other restrictions on court’s authority to change
trustee).
34 See supra note 30.
35 See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
36 See Leslie, supra note 6, at 2719.
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transactions would be within the settor’s intent would be more narrow
than moving to a good faith test for all amateur trustees, but the latter
may negate the rule in cases where the traditional justifications for the
rule are still present. The rule was intended to protect the beneficiary
because of the difficulty of monitoring—particularly where the
beneficiary has limited capacity—and the ease with which a trustee can
abuse its power over another person’s assets.37 Just because a trustee
does not perform those duties for a living does not necessarily mean that
the need for protection lessens.
These are just preliminary thoughts regarding the optimal methods
to distinguish these beneficiaries and to improve trust administration.
Professor Leslie has demonstrated that separating the two with respect
to fiduciary duties is a worthwhile inquiry. However, the differences
and purposes of the rules governing trustees that she proposes be
adjusted need to be analyzed from all angles before conclusions can be
drawn about how best to accommodate the differences.

37 Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and
Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 450 (1998).

